We need a "Rip and Roll" Airborne

One of the limitations of our legendary and highly respected US Airborne units (as Stan Crist likes to point out) is that they are strategically mobile (in terms of getting there), but not tactically mobile (once there). Our airborne units can be rapidly delivered and dropped anywhere in the world (on 18 hours notice), at jet speed; but they revert to heavily-laden foot-soldier speed once they hit the ground. They are also limited in mobility by the fact they don't have heavy firepower while moving, since artillery is limited to towed weapons. They provide a unique forced entry seizing capability, but then must hold on until a land mobile assault force can be unloaded.

This is why the 82nd's mission now is primarily to Seize and Hold (and repair/improve if necessary) airfields (or seaports), upon which airplanes (or ships) can land mechanized vehicles and "legs" (non-airborne troops) within 36 hours. Here's the 82nd's mission as stated at GlobalSecurity.org:

The 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, provides the ability to begin executing a strategic airborne forcible entry into any area of the world within 18 hours of notification. Their primary mission is airfield and seaport seizure. Once on the ground, they provide the secured terrain and facilities to rapidly receive additional combat forces.

A SEIZE and HOLD forced entry capability is adequate in many cases, but for others we need a force which can RIP (jump using rip chords) and ROLL (move rapidly on wheels or tracks).

Previous engagements have demonstrated the need

The disastrous results at Market Garden in WWII showed what can happen when support units don't show up as scheduled after a drop. See the movie "A Bridge Too Far" if you'd rather see and hear than read.

Here's what Army Chief of Staff General Erick K. Shinseki said in 2000 about the use of the 82nd Airborne in the first Gulf War:

"Our response was to take a brigade of the great 82nd Airborne Division, airlift them quickly and put them in the desert to block... They didn't have tactical mobility, they didn't have weapons platforms and they did not have an assault gun capability. And frankly, this is something we have to take care of."

You can see where the 82nd came in to the far left on this map, if you don't recall.

It's been nearly four years since he made that assessment, and nothing has been done to take care of the problem. Essentially the same thing was done with the 173rd Airborne (based in Italy) in the second invasion (more about this below).

We could have used a rip & roll airborne in northern Iraq when Turkey would not allow the 4th ID to enter Iraq across its border. The 173rd Airborne (established as a forward entry force in Vicenza, Italy in mid-2000) did fly 1800 miles to drop 1000 paratroopers into the Bashar airfield in Northern Iraq on 26 MAR 03 (the only combat airborne drop into Iraq to date), but it was not equipped (in terms of mobility and firepower) to spearhead a major drive from the north, and the 4th ID's mechanized vehicles were on ships already. After it seized the airfield, C-17s did land mechanized equipment, but it was used to to deter Iraqi aggression against Kurds and factional fighting in northern Iraq, as described in this Army Times article, not as an assault from the north.

What vehicles would be needed for ripping and rolling?

Crist promotes tracked M113A3 APCs as troop carriers everywhere he can (on websites and in magazines). [In fact, he pushes the tracked M113 and dis'es the wheeled Stryker so fervently that it's sometimes hard to absorb his many good ideas.] Personally, I'd rather see fast 2-man or 3-man vehicles (and maybe some dirt bikes as well, though it would take Annie Oakley to drive a dirt bike and shoot back at the same time), reducing the value of land mines and roadside bombs to our enemies. The unarmored ALSV's defense is its speed (making it harder to hit accurately) and the fact that no one unit is that significant a target (as it carries only 2-3 men instead of 7 or 8). The M113s (or similar-sized wheeled vehicles) could be used for support and supply vehicles. Depending upon the terrain, both vehicles are not restricted to wide, firm roadways like the very wide and heavy wheeled Strykers (one of which crushed the edge of a roadway and rolled into a canal, resulting in some drownings).

ASLV (click for larger image)

I'd like to see ASLVs air dropped (with a few spares, allowing for a projected % damage) so every paratrooper could ride. It would be the modern-day equivalent of the Panzers on motorcycles and sidecars. Multiple ASLVs could be dropped on one pallet, ready to be unstrapped and cranked up. Add air-droppable mechanized artillery, and the Airborne could rip and roll! (an ACE coined term)

After the Airborne has dropped in and seized a runway, the C17s can land with the "leg" troops, the Stryker vehicles, the Humvees, the mechanized artillery, and the Abrams tanks; which can catch up with the Air & Land Mobile Airborne with attached Air & Land Mobile Mechanized units, which will already be deep into enemy territory by the time the Strykers are rolling. We need all these things, well coordinated as a multi-service mission (the area most improved since the first Gulf war).

The 13.5 ton tracked M113A3 (which is dramatically improved from the original M113 used in Vietnam) can be airdropped or airlifted and can be configured for various support functions.

M113 being airdropped from a C-130

Providing rolling firepower is more challenging

While the ASLV and the M113 provide a ready solution for getting the troops, support, and supplies rolling once they hit the ground, providing serious rolling firepower is a more challenging task. The 82nd disbanded the 3rd Battalion, 73rd Armored Regiment, which used the airdroppable but aging M551 Sheridan light tank, in 1997. The 82nd is currently limited to towed artillery and mortar weapons which cannot be fired on the move, as well as handheld anti-materiel weapons. The M8 gun system program was terminated in 1996 as a cost-cutting move.

This 101st photo illustrates the delivery of a M119A1 howitzer to the target zone using a UH-60 helicopter, in keeping with the 101st Airborne's re-focus on "air assault" since around 1974. Once on target, these howitzers are typically set up in circular fire support batteries, very similar to the fire support bases in Vietnam.

The cheapest, fastest way to address the need for serious rolling firepower is to attach two 106mm recoilless rifles to a M113A3 via a cupola, similar to those built in Spain and Pakistan. A variety of anti-tank, bunker-busting, and anti-personnel rounds are available for the 106mm on the world market. For more possibilities, see the Crist article linked above.

Maybe one rip & roll brigade per division is enough

Maybe only one airborne brigade (along with any attached units) needs to be equipped for "ripping and rolling," as not all airborne missions will require speedy movement and assault firepower once on the ground.

Ripping and rolling is not currently a high priority for US airborne units

Both the 82nd and the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) have been focused on ground missions in Iraq and Afghanistan which don't require their unique air mobile capabilities. [Hopefully the focus will shift back to their primary purpose, now that they are being rotated out of Iraq.] The 82nd commander cancelled a special program developing a transition to a more modern airborne in 2003.

The current focus is on "seize and hold" missions (most likely airfields) with expected quick reinforcement by air-landed mechanized units. This is fine for lightly-guarded airfields if we have the element of surprise before reinforcements are brought in, but how do we deal with heavily fortified targets (when diplomacy delays have allowed the enemy time to heavily reinforce the position)? Since the enemy knows we don't have the ability to move very far very fast, he can better predict where we'll land. What do we do if Americans are being held hostage by a significant force far from an airfield, and we don't want to telegraph a surprise rescue mission (thereby risking the lives of the hostages) by seizing an airport within helicopter range or bringing a ship within helicopter range?

Transitioning to an airdroppable mobile assault force will probably not get a higher priority until a stand-alone real-world mission (as opposed to a mission as part of a bigger operation) shows the need for one.

Sheridan's dropped into Panama for Operation Just Cause, where they came in very handy (but the 82nd no onger has them)
(click here if it's not showing for you)

In a futue post, I'll show how the Russians have addressed this need.

For reference, here are the units of the 82nd Airborne Division (including those attached).

Stan Crist deserves the credit (or blame) for most of these ideas, if you like them (or not)

While I'll take credit (or blame) for the "Rip & Roll" name, and the idea of using the dune-buggy type vehicles; Stan Crist deserves credit for his long-term lobbying for modernization of the Airborne, which really hasn't evolved much (beyond minor refinements and equipment modernization) since it was first used in WWII. [Air Assault using helicopters like the 101st has adopted is something else (better for some missions) and not an evolution of the traditional Airborne concept, as far as I'm concerned.] He's far more knowledgeable on the current capabilities and limitations of both the 82nd and 101st than I am. You'll find his web pages (in annoying large, bold print) all over the net. Unfortunately, he turns people off with his constant lobbying for the M113 (which leads one to wonder if he doesn't have some financial arrangement with the manufacturer), and his increasingly vicious attacks on the Stryker. Ignore those two things, and you can learn a lot by reading his web pages and articles. As an example, see "Airborne Armor" in Special Weapons, one of those expensive special publication put out by Gun Buyer's Annual.